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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“[T]he benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed 
to that of their general suppression.”1 
 
“At the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets 
lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme 
Court.”2 
 
[1]  The United States antitrust and patent laws share a common goal: to 
encourage innovation and competition with the ultimate objective of 
benefiting the nation’s consumers.3  As described in the Sherman Act,4 the 
                                                 
* J.D., cum laude, Temple University, 2004; M.S.E., University of Pennsylvania, 2000; 
B.S.E., cum laude, Princeton University, 1997.  Law Clerk to the Honorable Jan E. 
DuBois, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2004-05.  I 
would like to acknowledge Professors David G. Post and Salil K. Mehra for their 
assistance and guidance and to thank Aliza Rabinowitz for her editorial suggestions and 
limitless patience during the writing of this Article. 
1 V THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., New York, G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1895).   
2 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 
1997) [hereinafter Kodak II]. 
3 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, 
wholly at odds.  However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are 
aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”). 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). 
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antitrust laws seek to protect free competition and consumer choice by 
discouraging monopolistic behavior and other types of anticompetitive 
conduct.5  
  
[2]  By comparison, the Patent Act seeks to promote innovation by 
rewarding patentees with a statutorily protected monopoly right to exclude 
others from their patented inventions for a limited time.6  Given that the 
patent laws grant monopolies while the antitrust laws seek to proscribe 
them, a question emerges from the tension between the two doctrines: 
How far may a patent holder extend his patent rights without incurring 
antitrust liability? 
 
[3]  Congress,7 the courts,8 and government agencies9 have recognized the 
need to strike a reasonable balance between antitrust and patent law in 
determining how far a patentee may extend his right to exclude others 
from the use of his patented goods.  At present, the Federal and Ninth 
Circuits are divided on the issue of whether a patentee’s refusal to deal in 
his patented property is a violation of the antitrust laws.  This circuit split 
is the focus of this paper.   
 
[4]  Structural shifts in the United States economy have made the 
promotion and protection of innovation more pressing than ever.  In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the United States began its evolution 
away from a nation based primarily on heavy manufacturing,10 to a nation 
where firms derive revenue11 and other less tangible value from their 
intellectual property.12   
                                                 
5 Id. §§ 1-2.  
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000). 
7 See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S14,434 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988) (illustrating Congressional 
concern with interplay between antitrust and patent laws). 
8 See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (Kodak II).    
9 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) (containing agency guidance on 
the overlap and conflict between antitrust and patent laws) [hereinafter 1995 ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES].  
10 In 1956, blue-collar workers ceased to make up the majority of the United States 
workforce for the first time in history.  SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE  4 (1999) . 
11 For example, Texas Instruments, one of the world’s largest producers of electronics, 
now generates more revenue from licensing its patents and winning patent infringement 
cases than from sales of actual products.  Id. at 5.  For a comprehensive discussion of the 
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[5]  In today’s economy, the ability of high-technology firms to financially 
exploit their patented inventions is of paramount importance.13  Central to 
a firm’s ability to fully exploit its patented products is that firm’s right to 
decide whether to sell or not to sell its products to certain customers.14  
While firms do have a right to choose their customers, this right is not 
unqualified; a firm’s refusal to license or sell products can give rise to 
antitrust liability in certain situations.15   
 
[6]  In Kodak II, decided in 1997, the Ninth Circuit determined that a 
patentee who refuses to license his patented invention to others without 
legitimate business justifications for doing so has violated antitrust law.16  
In 2000, the Federal Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in CSU, 
L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., and held that a patentee who does not violate the 
patent laws may, regardless of his business justifications, refuse to license 
or sell his patented invention without incurring antitrust liability.17  The 
opposing results reached in the Kodak II and Xerox cases highlight the 
tension between the antitrust and patent laws as courts struggle with the 
question of whether patent holders may exercise their patent rights free of 
antitrust limitation. 
 
                                                                                                                         
financial and strategic benefits that firms can secure through patent licensing, see KEVIN 
G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN 
VALUE OF PATENTS (2000). 
12 Some studies demonstrate positive correlations between a firm’s patent activity and 
other indicators of that firm’s economic performance, including profitability and stock 
prices.  MARYANN P. FELDMAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: 
AN OVERVIEW OF INITIATIVES TO FOSTER INNOVATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 56-57 (2002). 
13 By one account, intellectual property comprises two-thirds of the market value of 
United States corporations.  Jenna Greene, Patent Office at Center Stage, NAT’L L. J., 
Jan. 15, 2001, at B8.  
14 In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Supreme Court noted that 
“[t]he absence of a duty to transact business with another firm is . . . the counterpart of 
the independent businessman’s cherished right to select his customers and his associates.”  
472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985) [hereinafter Aspen Skiing II].  
15 E.g., id. (reiterating that a refusal to deal with competitors can give rise to antitrust 
liability where the refusal is not supported by legitimate business justifications). 
16 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 
1997) (Kodak II). 
17 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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[7]  By examining Kodak II, Xerox, and other related cases and statutes, 
this paper will describe the current legal analyses courts apply to refusals 
to deal in patented property.18  This paper will also compare and critique 
several recent appellate decisions concerning patentees’ refusals to deal in 
their patented goods.19  Finally, this paper will conclude with a summary 
of the current state of antitrust and patent law as they each apply to a 
party’s refusal to license intellectual property to competitors.20  That 
section will also identify the specific issues that the courts and the 
legislature should resolve in order to ensure a consistent approach to 
future cases involving refusals to deal in patented goods.21   
 
II. REFUSALS TO DEAL IN PATENTED AND NON-PATENTED GOODS 
  
A. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Refusals to Deal  
 
[8]  Created to protect unrestrained competition, Congress designed the 
Sherman Act to preserve consumer choice and promote efficiency in the 
United States economy.22  Justice Black described the goals of the 
Sherman Act in the following way: 
 
The Sherman Act was designed to be a 
comprehensive charter of economic liberty 
aimed at preserving free and unfettered 
competition as the rule of trade.  It rests on 
the premise that the unrestrained 
interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress . . 
. .”23 
 
                                                 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part III.   
20 See infra Part IV.   
21 Id. 
22 See generally Carole A. Casey, Note, The Rule of Reason Analysis of Dual Distribution 
Systems: Does it Further the Purposes of the Sherman Act?, 29 B.C. L. REV. 431 (1988). 
23 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
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[9]  Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, any “contract, combination . . ., or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce” is illegal.24  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act applies by definition to multiple-firm conduct, but the 
Supreme Court has found that certain acts of individual firms, such as 
“tying” the sale of one good to the purchase of another,25 can constitute a 
violation of § 1.26  For example, a patentee who commits a “tying” by 
refusing to deal in his patented product unless a buyer purchases a second, 
separate product, from the patentee violates § 1 of the Sherman Act.27 
 
[10]  By definition, § 2 of the Sherman Act applies to single-firm conduct 
and criminalizes both actual monopolization and attempts to 
monopolize.28  A patentee who uses his monopoly patent rights in one 
product in an effort to secure a monopoly position in a separate product 
may be acting in violation of § 2.29  To sustain a claim of monopolization 
under § 2, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) the defendant has 
“possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,” 30 and (2) the 
defendant has engaged in “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”31   
 
                                                 
24 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (discussing conduct 
commonly associated with violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, including: price fixing, 
group boycotts, and group agreements to restrict output). 
25 See generally Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (explaining that tying 
occurs when a firm with market power in a particular product forces buyers of that 
product to also purchase another product in a separate, often unrelated market). 
26 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 7 (finding a § 1 violation where a landowner tied 
a land lease to the purchase of services from the landowner’s separate shipping business).  
27 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992) 
[hereinafter Kodak I].  
28 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (“Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize . 
. . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).    
29 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 
1997) (Kodak II) (discussing how monopolists exploit their positions to gain monopolies 
in other markets). 
30 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 481 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-
71 (1966)); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 
(1956) (defining “monopoly power” as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition”).   
31 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 481.  
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[11]  To prove the monopoly power element of a § 2 claim, an antitrust 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has a dominant market share 
as well as the ability to control prices and exclude competition in the 
relevant market.32  According to the Supreme Court, patent holders have 
monopoly power in the market for their products. 33  A plaintiff must also 
show that there are barriers to entry into the relevant market;34 such 
barriers allow a monopolist to maintain his market share without 
competition from new market entrants.35 
 
[12]  To satisfy the second requirement of a § 2 claim—that a defendant 
has unfairly exercised or attempted to exercise monopoly power—a 
plaintiff must show that the alleged monopolist used his monopoly power 
“‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a 
competitor.’”36  A refusal to sell or license a product in order to leverage 
or extend monopoly power into a separate market for a separate product 
may violate § 2.37  If a plaintiff alleges that a monopolist engaged in such 
a practice, the monopolist must demonstrate a legitimate business 
justification for his anticompetitive activity.38  Examples of acceptable 
business justifications for refusals to deal include: maintaining quality 
                                                 
32 Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 391). 
33 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (finding that “it 
is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the [patent holder] 
market power”). 
34 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing an 
example of a barrier to entry as a market in which would-be competitors must make a 
large capital investment in order to participate). 
35 Id. at 51. 
36 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 
(1948)). 
37 See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217-18 
(9th Cir. 1997) (Kodak II); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 
546-47 (9th Cir. 1991). 
38 See, e.g., LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (requiring 
an accused monopolist to demonstrate a business-related justification for anticompetitive 
conduct to avoid antitrust liability under § 2); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II) (requiring an explanation for 
ski lift owner’s exclusionary actions to avoid antitrust liability). 
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control,39 controlling inventory costs,40 and the desire to exclude others 
from one’s intellectual property.41 
 
[13]  The Supreme Court has developed several analyses to find whether a 
refusal to deal with competitors is an antitrust violation.  The first of these 
is the “intent” analysis articulated in United States v. Colgate & Co.42  
This analysis requires that a court scrutinize a monopolist’s decision to 
refuse to deal with its competitors by looking for any predatory intent to 
perpetuate the monopolist’s controlling market position.43   
 
[14]  A second limit on a monopolist’s right to refuse to deal with 
competitors arises where a monopolist in a given market controls a 
commodity or service that is crucial to the ability of all other participants 
in that market to compete; courts refer to such a commodity as an 
“essential facility.”44  Where courts find that a monopolist has refused 
access to an essential facility, the monopolist must give competitors access 
to that facility on a reasonable basis.45   
  
                                                 
39 See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483.  
40 Id. at 484. 
41 See, e.g., Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support 
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).  
42 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).   
43 See id. at 307.  In Colgate, the Supreme Court noted that a monopolist was free to 
refuse to deal with any customer, but could not do so in an intentional effort to establish 
or maintain a monopoly.  Id.  In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., the 
Court determined that a corporation’s decision to refuse to sell products to a competitor 
was not motivated by anything other than an intent to create a monopoly.  273 U.S. 359, 
375 (1927). 
44 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).  The 
Seventh Circuit has created a widely-accepted test to determine the existence of an 
essential facility: (1) a monopolist controls the facility in question; (2) other market 
participants cannot reasonably duplicate the facility; (3) the monopolist unreasonably 
denies access to the facility to its competitors; and (4) shared use of the facility is 
feasible.  Id. at 1132-33. 
45 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th Cir. 
1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) [hereinafter Aspen Skiing I].  Courts have imposed 
some limitations on the scope of the essential facilities doctrine.  See, e.g., Cavalier Tel., 
LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc., 330 F.3d 176, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2003) (examining the 
relationship of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the Sherman Act); Interface 
Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that a firm need 
not license an essential facility to a non-competitor). 
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[15]  In recent antitrust cases, the Supreme Court has favored an analysis 
of a monopolist’s business justifications for his  refusal to deal over 
consideration of the monopolist’s intent or whether the monopolist 
possessed an essential facility.46  The following two cases illustrate the 
Court’s focus on business justifications for an antitrust defendant’s refusal 
to deal.   
 
1. Aspen Skiing 
 
[16]  The first of these two cases, Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v.  Aspen 
Skiing Co., involved a claim of monopolization by the plaintiff, Highlands, 
against the defendant, Ski Co. 47  Highlands owned one of the four ski 
resorts in Aspen, Colorado and Ski Co. owned the remaining three.48  The 
basis of Highlands’s complaint in Aspen Skiing was that Ski Co. had 
discontinued its practice of cooperating with Highlands in issuing an 
interchangeable six-day pass that could be used on any of the four Aspen-
area ski facilities because Ski Co. was dissatisfied with its share of the 
revenues from the four-facility pass.49   
 
[17]  After discontinuing the joint Highlands-Ski Co. pass, Ski Co. (1) 
replaced the four-facility pass with a pass that could only be used at one of 
Ski Co.’s three facilities and (2) took additional steps to prevent Highlands 
from marketing its own multi-area ticket package to replace the joint 
offering.50  Unable to offer a convenient all-Aspen ticket, Highlands 
“bec[ame] a day ski area in a destination resort,” and suffered a steady 
decline in its share of the market for Aspen downhill ski services.51  
Highlands then filed a complaint in federal court alleging that Ski Co. had 
monopolized the market for Aspen ski services in violation of § 2 of the 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) 
(Kodak I). 
47 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (Aspen Skiing 
II). 
48 Aspen Skiing I, 738 F.2d at 1512. 
49 Aspen Skiing II, 472 U.S. at 592-93. 
50 Id. at 593.  Specifically, “Ski Co. discontinued the [three]-day, [three]-area pass for the 
1978-1979 season, and also refused to sell Highlands any lift tickets [to ski areas owned 
by Ski Co.], either at the tour operator’s discount or at retail.”  Id. (citations omitted).    
51 Id. at 595.  Highlands’ share of overall Aspen ski revenues declined from 20.5% in 
1976-1977 to 11% in 1980-1981.  Id at 595-96. 
8 
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XI, Issue 2 
 
 
Sherman Act.52  A jury found for Highlands,53 and the Tenth Circuit 
upheld the verdict.54  The Tenth Circuit determined (1) that the multi-
resort ticket was an essential facility that Ski Co. was obligated to market 
together with Highlands, and (2) that the jury properly found that Ski 
Co.’s purpose for refusing to market the four-area ticket was motivated by 
the intent to “‘create or maintain a monopoly.’”55 
 
[18]  On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Tenth 
Circuit and stated that while a firm with monopoly power like Ski Co. had 
“no duty to engage in joint marketing with a competitor,” a monopolist’s 
right to refuse to deal was not unqualified.56  Declining to employ either 
the intent or essential facilities analyses,57 the Court focused on the 
objective evidence of the case and found that Ski Co. had violated § 2 
because the firm had failed to provide any legitimate business justification 
for its refusal to deal with Highlands.58  
 
2. Kodak I 
 
[19]  In the second of these two cases, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc. (“Kodak I”), the Court again considered a 
monopolist’s business justifications where a plaintiff claimed that the 
monopolist’s refusal to deal was a violation of the antitrust laws. 59   In the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 595.  
53 Id.   
54 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 
1984) (Aspen Skiing I). 
55 Id. at 1520-21 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).  
The Tenth Circuit noted that Ski Co.’s refusal to cooperate with Highlands made Ski Co. 
“the only business in Aspen that could offer a multi-day multi-mountain skiing 
experience” and that there was no valid business reason for refusing to accept the 
vouchers included in Highlands’ Adventure Pack.  Id. at 1521-22.  
56 Aspen Skiing II, 472 U.S. at 600-01. 
57 Id. at 611 n.44.    
58 Id. at 608.  The Court also noted that Ski Co. had “elected to make an important change 
in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted 
for several years,” but that Ski Co. could not provide any legitimate business justification 
for that change.  Id. at 603-05.  The Court concluded by noting that while Ski Co.’s 
actions were not necessarily “‘bold, relentless, and predatory,’” the evidence in the case 
supported the jury’s conclusion that Ski Co. had “made a deliberate effort to discourage 
its customers from doing business with [Highlands].”  Id. at 610 (quoting Lorain Journal 
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951)). 
59 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (Kodak I). 
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1980s, the Eastman Kodak Company sold photocopier equipment into a 
highly competitive market, competing with IBM, Canon, and Xerox.60  
Kodak provided replacement parts and service for its equipment and either 
manufactured these replacement parts itself or purchased necessary parts 
from independent original-equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”).61   
 
[20]  In the early 1980s, a number of so-called independent service 
organizations (“ISOs”) emerged to address the service market for Kodak 
equipment, competing directly with Kodak for the opportunity to service 
Kodak photocopier equipment.62  The ISOs obtained the replacement parts 
they needed from either Kodak or OEMs.63  Kodak began to restrict the 
ISOs’ access to Kodak’s replacement parts as the ISOs grew more 
competitive.64  To further hinder the ISOs’ entry into the Kodak copier 
service market, Kodak stopped selling replacement parts to the ISOs 
altogether in 1986, and convinced the OEMs not to sell replacement parts 
to the ISOs.65  Because the ISOs could no longer service Kodak equipment 
without a consistent supply of replacement parts, Kodak’s policy 
effectively deprived the ISOs of their ability to compete with Kodak for 
equipment service contracts.66   
 
[21]  In 1987, the ISOs filed an action against Kodak alleging that Kodak 
(1) had unlawfully tied the sale of Kodak photocopier equipment to the 
sale of service for that equipment, and (2) monopolized or attempted to 
monopolize the sale of service for Kodak photocopiers by unfairly 
refusing to sell or license its replacement parts to the ISOs.67  The district 
court granted summary judgment to Kodak without a hearing,68 and after 
                                                 
60 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 
1997) (Kodak II).  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1201.  Some customers believed the ISOs’ service to be “cheaper and better” than 
Kodak’s service.  Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.   
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17218, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1988).  
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the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,69 Kodak appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of 
summary judgment, finding that there were sufficient factual disputes 
between Kodak and the ISOs to create genuine issues of material fact on 
the ISOs’ tying and monopolization claims.70 
 
[22]  Addressing the ISOs’ § 1 claim that Kodak had tied the sale of its 
equipment to the sale of service, the Supreme Court determined that 
questions of fact existed as to (1) whether the parts and service markets 
were separate,71 (2) whether Kodak tied the sale of parts and the sale of 
service together,72 and (3) whether Kodak had sufficient market power in 
the tying market for parts to force parts buyers to also purchase services.73  
Turning its attention to the ISOs’ § 2 claim of monopolization, the Court 
first found that the ISOs had presented sufficient evidence to prove that 
Kodak had clear monopoly power in the market for replacement parts.74  
After establishing the likely existence of market power, the Court began 
its analysis of the second prong of the ISOs’ § 2 claim that Kodak used its 
monopoly power in the replacement parts market “‘to foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor’” 
in the service market.75  
 
[23]  First, the Court cited to Aspen Skiing for the proposition that “a firm 
can refuse to deal with its competitors.  But such a right is not absolute; it 
exists only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.”76  
The Court then noted that because the ISOs had presented evidence 
                                                 
69 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 1990).  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the ISOs had come forward with 
adequate evidence to raise sufficient factual disputes concerning the validity of Kodak’s 
claimed business justifications for its policies.  Id. at 618–20. 
70 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464–65, 477–79, 
481, 483–86 (1992) (Kodak I). 
71 Id. at 462–63. 
72 Id. at 463. 
73 Id. at 464–78. 
74 Id. at 481.  The ISOs introduced evidence at trial showing that Kodak controlled nearly 
100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market, and that Kodak’s 
customers did not have easily obtainable substitutes for Kodak’s products or repair 
services.  Id. 
75 Id. at 482–83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)). 
76 Id. at 483 n.32 (citing Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 
585, 602-05 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II)) (emphasis added).  
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alleging that Kodak exercised exclusionary action to maintain its 
monopoly on replacement parts and used its control over the replacement 
parts market to strengthen its monopoly share of the copier service market, 
Kodak’s liability turned on whether “‘valid business reasons’” could 
explain Kodak’s actions.77  While Kodak advanced three business 
justifications for its refusal to deal,78 the Court highlighted evidence that 
rebutted each of those justifications.79  Based on the factual questions this 
evidence raised about the “validity and sufficiency” of Kodak’s claimed 
business justifications,80 the Court confirmed that the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case for trial.81 
 
B. Recent Appellate Cases: Refusals to Deal in Patented Goods 
 
[24]  While the Supreme Court now routinely examines defendants’ 
business justifications for refusals to deal in non-patented goods,82 less 
consistency exists in the appellate courts’ approaches to refusals to deal in 
patented goods.  Three recent appellate court cases—Image Technical 
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”), Intergraph Corp. v. 
Intel Corp. (“Intergraph”), and CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp. (“Xerox”)—
highlight the different analyses and conclusions appellate courts have 
reached in evaluating refusals to deal in patented property.  
 
1. Kodak II 
                                                 
77 Id. at 483 (quoting Aspen Skiing II, 472 U.S. at 605). 
78 Kodak’s proffered justifications were: “‘(1) to promote interbrand equipment 
competition by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of its service; (2) to improve asset 
management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and (3) to prevent ISOs from free-
riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts, and service.’”  Id. (quoting 
Petitioner’s Brief at 6). 
79 Id. at 483–86.  The Court noted that while Kodak claimed that preventing its customers 
from using ISOs helped Kodak to maintain the best-quality service for its equipment, the 
ISOs presented evidence that some customers believed that service rendered by ISOs was 
superior to service rendered by Kodak, thereby raising a genuine issue of fact.  Id. at 
483–84.  The Court then found that the second justification, reducing inventory costs, 
failed to explain Kodak’s refusal to sell replacement parts to the ISOs.  Id. at 484–85.  
Finally, the Court observed that since the ISOs had invested substantially in the service 
market but not the equipment and parts market, Kodak’s third justification would 
unlawfully require the ISOs to simultaneously enter two markets.  Id. at 485. 
80 Id. at 483. 
81 Id. at 486. 
82 See generally, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S 398 (2004); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998). 
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[25]  After the Supreme Court denied Kodak’s motion for summary 
judgment in Kodak I and remanded the case for trial,83 a jury found that 
Kodak had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act and awarded the plaintiff ISOs 
$71.8 million in trebled damages.84  In addition to the jury’s damage 
award, the district court issued a ten-year injunctive order requiring Kodak 
to sell all replacement parts and necessary technical documents to ISOs on 
reasonable terms.85  Appealing to the Ninth Circuit, Kodak raised the issue 
of its patent rights, arguing that because patent holders have a right to 
refuse to license their patented products, Kodak’s refusal to license its 
patented replacement parts to the ISOs was not illegal.86  Affirming the 
district court and rejecting Kodak’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit held that 
a monopolist’s refusal to license his patented product in order to exclude 
competition for a separate product in a separate market could qualify as 
exclusionary conduct under § 2 of the Sherman Act.87   
 
[26]  In its analysis, the Kodak II court first considered whether Kodak had 
market power in the relevant market.88  Kodak argued that the market for 
each individual component part itself was a separate market because no 
two parts were interchangeable, thus creating thousands of individual parts 
markets and requiring the ISO plaintiffs to demonstrate their inability to 
obtain each of these individual replacement parts.89  The court disagreed 
with Kodak and found that the relevant market consisted of all 
                                                 
83 See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of Kodak I. 
84 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 
1997) (Kodak II).  The jury considered only the ISOs’ § 2 monopolization claim in 
assessing damages; the ISOs withdrew their § 1 conspiracy and tying claims before 
closing arguments.  Id. 
85 Id. at 1201-02.   
86 Id. at 1214.  Kodak disputed a jury instruction which stated that business conduct that 
is immune to antitrust liability “‘does not refer to ordinary means of competition, like 
offering better products or services, exercising superior skill or business judgment, 
utilizing more efficient technology, or exercising natural competitive advantages.’”  Id. 
(quoting Jury Instruction No. 28).  In formulating this jury instruction, the district court 
had rejected Kodak’s proposal to include “‘exercising lawful patents and copyrights’ 
amongst the list of non-exclusionary” business practices included in the jury instruction.  
Id. 
87 See id. at 1209.  
88 Id. at 1202-03. 
89 Id. at 1203. 
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replacement parts for Kodak copiers.90  Finding that there were significant 
barriers to entry into the parts market, the court found that Kodak had 
monopoly power in the market for replacement Kodak parts.91 
 
[27]  Next, the court examined the second element of the ISOs’ § 2 claim: 
whether Kodak had used its monopoly power “‘to foreclose competition, 
to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’”92  Kodak 
argued that the only basis for liability in the context of a monopolist’s 
refusal to deal arose under the essential facilities doctrine, in which a 
monopolist’s refusal to grant access to a product or service eliminates 
competition in a downstream market.93  Declining to apply the essential 
facilities doctrine, the Ninth Circuit determined that a refusal to deal was 
unlawful unless supported by “a legitimate business justification.”94 
 
[28]  The court then considered whether Kodak’s exercise of its patent 
rights could form such a legitimate business justification, noting that the 
question it was addressing—whether a monopolist’s refusal to sell or 
license a patented product creates antitrust liability in the context of a § 2 
monopoly leveraging claim—was one of first impression.95  
Acknowledging the public policy underlying the limited monopoly 
granted to patent holders, the court recognized that patentees normally 
have the right to refuse to license or sell their patented work.96  At the 
same time, the court also recognized that a patentee’s right to exclude 
others from their patented property was not unlimited in scope and cited to 
a footnote from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kodak I for the 
proposition that a patentee may not “‘exploit[] his dominant position in 
one market to expand his empire into the next.’”97  The Kodak II court 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1206-07. 
92 Id. at 1208 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 482-
83 (1992) (Kodak I)). 
93 Id. at 1209. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 1214. 
96 Id. at 1215.  The Ninth Circuit stated that it had not found any reported cases where a 
court imposed liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license patented property.  Id. at 
1216. 
97 Id. at 1215 (quoting Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 480 n.29).  The Ninth Circuit interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Kodak I that “power gained through some natural 
advantage such as a patent . . . can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant 
position in one market to expand his empire into the next,’” 504 U.S. at 480 n.29 (quoting 
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then concluded that a monopolist’s desire to exclude competitors from his 
patented property could be a presumptively valid business justification.98  
A plaintiff could rebut this presumption of validity by showing (1) that the 
patent had been unlawfully acquired or (2) that the monopolist’s desire to 
exclude competitors was merely a pretext used to conceal anticompetitive 
conduct.99  Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that although Kodak’s desire to exclude others from its patented 
products was a presumptively valid business justification, the jury had 
properly concluded that Kodak’s proffered business justifications were 
pretextual.100 
 
[29]  In its opinion, the Kodak II court recognized the importance of 
properly defining the scope of Kodak’s patent protection and the scope of 
the relevant antitrust market for Kodak’s patented goods.101  First, the 
Kodak II court found that parts and service were separate markets for 
antitrust purposes.102  The court next noted that the critical inquiry in the 
case was whether the service market fell within the scope of Kodak’s 
patent grant.103  If the scope of the patent grant for Kodak’s patented parts 
included only the antitrust market for those parts and did not also 
encompass the antitrust market for service, Kodak’s refusal to sell its 
patented parts in order to dominate the separate service market would fall 
outside the scope of its patent grant and would therefore be illegal under § 
2 of the Sherman Act.104  If, alternatively, the scope of Kodak’s parts 
patent included both the parts market and the service market, then 
                                                                                                                         
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)), to mean that 
“the [Supreme Court] supposed that intellectual property rights do not confer an absolute 
immunity from antitrust claims.”  Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1216.  
98 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 
36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
99 Id. at 1219. 
100 Id. at 1219-20.  The court noted (1) that Kodak’s manager stated that protection of 
patented items did not motivate his decision not to sell replacement parts to the ISOs and 
(2) that Kodak’s blanket refusal to license included both patented and unpatented parts.  
Id. at 1219.   
101 Id. at 1216-17. 
102 Id. at 1217.  In Kodak I, the Supreme Court determined that parts and service were 
separate markets for antitrust purposes.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 
504 U.S. 451, 463 (1992). 
103 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1217.    
104 See id.  
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Kodak’s conduct would be within the scope of its patent rights and would 
not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.105 
 
[30]  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that patent law—and not 
antitrust law—should determine the breadth of the patent grant and that 
Kodak’s refusal to deal in its patented parts unfairly extended its patent 
into the service market.106  The Kodak II analysis, which effectively 
placed limits on a patent holder’s right to exclude others from their 
patented goods, was explicitly criticized three years later by the Federal 
Circuit in that court’s Xerox decision.107 
 
2. Intergraph 
 
[31]  Intel is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of microprocessors.  
Intel sells its processors to producers of various computer-based devices, 
including computer graphics workstations; these producers are known as 
original-equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”).108  Beginning in 1987, one 
of these OEMs, Intergraph Corporation, manufactured computer 
workstations using an Intergraph-owned patented technology known as 
“Clipper.”109  In 1993 Intergraph stopped using Clipper microprocessors 
and switched to an Intel-produced technology as a replacement.110  Intel 
then “designated Intergraph as a ‘strategic customer’” and began to 
provide Intergraph with proprietary products and technical documents.111   
 
[32]  In 1996, Intergraph charged several Intel OEM customers with 
infringing its Clipper technology, and these OEMs sought indemnification 
from Intel.112  After Intel and Intergraph failed to resolve their dispute 
through negotiation, Intel ceased supplying Intergraph with the technical 
documentation and other benefits that Intel had previously provided to 
Intergraph.113  Intergraph then sued Intel for infringing the Clipper patents 
                                                 
105 See id.  
106 See id. at 1220.   
107 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
108 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
109 Id. at 1349-50. 
110 Id. at 1350. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
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while also alleging that Intel’s refusal to license its technology to 
Intergraph was a violation of the antitrust laws.114  Intergraph claimed that 
it could no longer participate in the competitive workstation business 
without access to Intel’s products.115  
 
[33]  The district court first concluded that Intel had tried to assert its 
monopoly power by “attempt[ing] to coerce Intergraph into relinquishing 
its intellectual property rights as a condition of Intel” continuing to supply 
chips to Intergraph.116  Applying the essential facilities doctrine, the 
district court found that Intel’s processor units and technical support were 
essential facilities for participants in the graphics workstation market.117  
The district court then held that Intel had used its monopoly power in the 
processor market to unfairly leverage its own business into Intergraph’s 
graphics workstation market.118 
  
[34]  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held 
that Intel was under no obligation to license its patented inventions to 
Intergraph.119  The Federal Circuit stated that: 
 
“the owner of proprietary information has no 
obligation to provide it, whether to a 
competitor, customer, or supplier.  Precedent 
makes clear that a customer who is 
dependent on a manufacturer’s supply of a 
component can not on that ground force the 
producer to provide it; there must also be an 
anticompetitive aspect invoking the Sherman 
Act [to warrant imposition of antitrust 
liability].”120   
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1351. 
116 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1276 (N.D. Ala. 1998). 
117 Id. at 1278.  
118 Id.  
119 Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1362.  The Federal Circuit noted that no court had ever 
imposed antitrust liability for a “‘unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or 
copyright.’”  Id. (quoting Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 
1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kodak II)). 
120 Id. at 1363. 
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The court noted that while such a situation was present in Kodak I and 
Kodak II, where Kodak had attempted to limit competition in the copier 
service market by leveraging its monopoly power in the parts market, Intel 
did not seek to leverage its monopoly power in the processor market into 
Intergraph’s workstation market.121  The Federal Circuit then concluded 
that because Intel and Intergraph did not compete with each other, Intel’s 
refusal to supply its proprietary microprocessors to Intergraph was not an 
antitrust violation.122    
 
3. Xerox 
 
[35]  In Xerox, the Federal Circuit considered a case factually similar to 
Kodak I and Kodak II.123  Xerox, a major manufacturer of photocopier and 
imaging equipment and provider of repair services for those products, 
instituted a policy under which the company would not sell its patented 
replacement parts to its ISO competitors in the photocopier service market 
unless those competitors were also end-users of Xerox copiers.124  The 
                                                 
121 Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 455, 458 
(1992) (Kodak I)). 
122 Id.  The court noted that Intel and Intergraph did not compete in the microprocessor 
market because Intergraph had abandoned production of its Clipper processors several 
years before the filing of its case against Intel.  Id. at 1355.  The court also noted that 
Intel’s actions would only affect Intergraph’s ability to succeed in the highly competitive 
workstation market; an action by Intel that would affect only a single competitor in that 
market did not do enough damage to that market as a whole to rise to the level of an 
antitrust violation.  Id. at 1359-60.  In a parallel proceeding, the FTC filed an action 
against Intel in 1998, alleging that Intel was a monopolist and had violated § 2 of the 
Sherman Act by denying advance information about its products to customers that had 
previously sued Intel for patent infringement.  In re Intel Corp., 128 F.T.C. 213, at *6-7 
(1998).  The FTC and Intel settled the dispute with a consent order under which Intel 
could initially decide whether or not to provide information to new customers and could 
terminate its relationship with a customer that failed to protect Intel’s intellectual 
property.  Under the consent order, Intel could not discriminate among existing customers 
on the grounds that Intel was involved in an intellectual property dispute with that 
customer.  Press Release, FTC, FTC Accepts Settlement of Charges Against Intel (Mar. 
17, 1999) at http://www.ftc.gov.opa/03/intelcom.htm. 
123 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
124 Id. at 1324.  Xerox’s exclusionary policy initially applied only to Xerox’s six most 
successful competitors in the copier service market but later included all of Xerox’s 
service market competitors.  Id.  Along with its policy to refuse to sell parts except to 
end-users of Xerox equipment, Xerox also implemented an on-site verification practice in 
which Xerox representatives would visit customer sites to confirm that the Xerox parts 
that customers or ISOs had purchased were actually for those purchasers’ end-use.  Id.  
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ISOs filed suit against Xerox, alleging that Xerox’s policy unlawfully 
extended the company’s monopoly in the market for Xerox replacement 
parts into the market for Xerox copier service and therefore violated the 
Sherman Act.125  The district court granted summary judgment for Xerox, 
finding that a patent holder’s refusal to license his patented products was 
not a violation of the antitrust laws even where that refusal to license 
impacted competition in more than one market.126  The plaintiff ISOs then 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.127   
 
[36]  Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Xerox, 
the Federal Circuit held that a patentee’s refusal to sell or license its 
patented product did not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless doing so 
exceeded the scope of its patent grant.128  In its holding, the Federal 
Circuit explicitly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s determination in 
Kodak II that a patent holder’s motivation for his refusal to deal was 
relevant to the antitrust analysis.129  First, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that while the patent laws did not confer a privilege to 
violate the antitrust laws,130 the antitrust laws did not abrogate a patentee’s 
right to exclude others from his patented property.131  The court noted next 
that although patent holders do not necessarily possess market power,132 
patentees with market power were under no obligation to allow others to 
license or use their patented property.133   
 
                                                 
125 See id.  
126 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., No. 94-2102-EEO, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23262, at *3-4 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1999); see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. 
Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D. Kan. 1997). 
127 Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1324. 
128 Id. at 1327 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1325 (citing Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
131 Id. (citing Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1362).   
132 Id.  But see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) 
(observing that consumers’ inability to obtain a patented product from any source other 
than the patentee gives the patentee market power).   
133 Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1326 (noting that, like the Ninth Circuit in Kodak I, the 
Federal Circuit was unable to find any case in which a court had “‘imposed antitrust 
liability for unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent’”) (quoting Intergraph Corp., 195 
F.3d at 1362).  
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[37]  The Federal Circuit also considered the language of the Patent Act, 
noting that § 271(d) of the Patent Act states, “‘no patent owner otherwise 
entitled to relief . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . (4) refused 
to license or use any rights to the patent.’”134  The Federal Circuit 
interpreted § 271(d) to mean that the owner of a lawfully obtained patent 
who refused to license his patented property was within his rights to do so 
and that a refusal to license a lawfully obtained patent could not be 
penalized under the antitrust laws.135  In the view of the Federal Circuit, 
the only types of patent-related conduct that could result in antitrust 
liability were (1) illegal tying arrangements,136 (2) fraud on the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),137 or (3) sham 
litigation.138  In the absence of any of these situations, the Federal Circuit 
found that patentees could refuse to license their patented products without 
fear of antitrust liability.139   
  
[38]  The Federal Circuit also rejected the ISO plaintiffs’ reliance on 
Kodak I for the proposition that a patentee could not use his patent-
protected position in one product market to expand into a separate product 
or service market.140  The court argued that Kodak I was a essentially a 
tying case and was distinguishable from Xerox because the plaintiffs in 
Xerox had not claimed that Xerox had tied the sale of patented 
replacement parts to the purchases of Xerox copier repair services.141 
                                                 
134 Id. at 1326 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1999)). 
135 Id. at 1327.  See infra Part III.B for a discussion of § 271(d) of the Patent Act and that 
statute’s applicability concerning refusals to deal in patented property. 
136 Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327.  The Federal Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Kodak I that “‘power gained through some natural and legal advantage such 
as a patent, . . . can give rise to liability if a seller exploits his dominant position in one 
market to expand his empire into the next’” as reiterating that a patent holder could not 
use their statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market 
beyond the scope of the patents, implicitly concluding that the service market was within 
the scope of the parts patents.  Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 (1992) (Kodak I)).  See infra Part III.A for a 
discussion of the Federal Circuit’s market scope analysis. 
137 Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. (stating that “[n]otably, Kodak was a tying case when it came before the Supreme 
Court”).   
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[39]  Finally, the Federal Circuit declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
rebuttable business justification analysis articulated in Kodak II and did 
not examine Xerox’s business reasons for refusing to deal in its patented 
products.142  Criticizing the Ninth Circuit, the Xerox court stated that the 
logic of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis “requires an evaluation of the 
patentee’s subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented 
products for pretext . . . ‘if a [patent infringement] suit is not objectively 
baseless, an antitrust defendant’s subjective motivation is immaterial.’”143  
The court summarized its holding: 
 
In the absence of any indication of any 
illegal tying, fraud in the [USPTO], or sham 
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the 
statutory right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention free from liability under the 
antitrust laws.  We therefore will not inquire 
into his subjective motivation for exercising 
his statutory rights, even though his refusal 
to sell or license his patented invention may 
have an anticompetitive effect, so long as 
that anticompetitive effect is not illegally 
extended beyond the statutory patent 
grant.144  
 
  
[40]  In sum, the Xerox court concluded that Xerox’s assertion of its patent 
rights was not a violation of the antitrust laws and that Xerox’s motives or 
business justifications for the refusal to deal in its patented goods were 
irrelevant. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
[41]  The above review of recent appellate decisions illustrates the 
contrasting legal analyses appellate courts apply to refusals to deal in 
                                                 
142 Id. at 1327-28. 
143 Id. at 1327 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 
1072 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original). 
144 Id. at 1327-28 (emphasis added). 
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patented property.  This section of the paper will discuss and distinguish 
the analyses of the Federal Circuit in Xerox and the Ninth Circuit in Kodak 
II and will also identify possible consequences of each court’s decision.145  
This section will also propose actions that either Congress or the Supreme 
Court might take to remedy the current confusion in the law and thus 
ensure consistent resolution of future antitrust cases involving refusals to 
deal in patented property.146 
 
A. Comparison of Federal and Ninth Circuit Analyses 
 
[42]  The Supreme Court has stated that a patentee with market power in 
one market is not necessarily immune from antitrust liability for conduct 
that affects a second market147 and that courts must examine the business 
justifications underlying a monopolist’s refusal to deal in his goods.148  
The Federal Circuit in Xerox failed to apply this Supreme Court precedent 
because it (1) allowed Xerox to leverage its patents on replacement copier 
parts into markets outside of the primary market for the patented parts and 
(2) failed to consider Xerox’s business justifications for its refusal to 
license patented property.  Although the Xerox court acknowledged certain 
narrow limitations on a patentee’s refusal to license their patented 
property,149 these limitations nevertheless give patentees significant 
latitude to refuse to license or sell their patented property free of antitrust 
liability, even where doing so leverages a patentee’s market power in their 
patented product into a separate market for a different product.   
 
[43]  By comparison, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Kodak II remained 
faithful to the Supreme Court precedent that the Federal Circuit ignored in 
Xerox.  The Kodak II court did not allow the patentee to exploit its parts 
patent into the separate market for service and required the patent holder 
to demonstrate legitimate business reasons for refusing to license his 
patented property.150 
                                                 
145 See infra Parts III.A-C.  
146 See infra Part III.D.  
147 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) 
(Kodak I).  
148 See id. at 483; see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585, 608-09 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II). 
149 Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
150 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-19 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (Kodak II).  
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1. Analyses of the Scope of Patent Grants 
 
[44]  The different outcomes in Kodak II and Xerox are partially explained 
by the fact that the Federal and Ninth Circuit each came to different 
conclusions as to whether a patent grant protects from antitrust liability a 
patentee’s conduct outside of the primary market for a patented good.  In 
Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance of defining the 
relevant markets for antitrust and patent purposes; noting that a finding of 
antitrust liability “depends largely on market definition.”151  In its Kodak 
II decision, the Ninth Circuit first determined that parts and service were 
separate markets for antitrust purposes.152  Based on this finding, the court 
then held that Kodak’s leveraging of its parts patent to dominate the 
separate copier service market was a violation of the antitrust laws.153  
Given that the Kodak II court found that Kodak was subject to antitrust 
liability for using its patent on copier parts to exert control over the 
separate antitrust market for copier service, the Kodak II court must have 
found that Kodak’s patent protection for its parts covered only the antitrust 
market for parts and did not also encompass the antitrust market for copier 
service.154   
 
[45]  In contrast, the Federal Circuit determined in Xerox that “a patent 
may confer the right to exclude competition altogether in more than one 
antitrust market.”155  In the Federal Circuit’s view, a patentee who refuses 
to deal in his patented property is immune from antitrust liability so long 
as he does not obtain his patent through fraud, engage in sham litigation, 
or engage in a tying arrangement.156  Provided that the patentee does not 
commit any of these proscribed acts, the Federal Circuit found it irrelevant 
                                                 
151 Id. at 1217. 
152 Id.  The Supreme Court in Kodak I determined that parts and service were separate 
markets for antitrust purposes.  Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 463. 
153 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1220. 
154 For additional discussion of antitrust and patent market definitions, see Marina Lao, 
Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to 
Deal, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (1999).  
155 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  
This stands in clear opposition to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kodak II that a patent 
could only confer a right to exclude competition in a single antitrust market.  See Kodak 
II, 125 F.3d at 1216.   
156 Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327.  
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whether a patentee’s use of his patent affects markets outside of the 
primary market for his patented good.157  In other words, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the scope of a lawfully obtained patent 
encompasses all possible antitrust or product markets into which the 
patented product is used or sold.  The Federal Circuit justified its view of 
the scope of patent protection by dismissing the claim that Kodak I stood 
for the proposition that a seller may not exploit a dominant position in one 
market to expand that domination into a separate market through a tying 
arrangement.158  The Federal Circuit also distinguished Kodak I from 
Xerox on the basis that Kodak I was a tying case when that case came 
before the Supreme Court.159  
 
[46]  Because Kodak I was not strictly a tying case, the Federal Circuit’s 
characterization of that case is incomplete.  While the plaintiffs in Kodak I 
did bring a § 1 tying claim against Kodak, the Kodak I plaintiffs also 
brought a § 2 monopoly leveraging claim,160 and the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the Kodak I plaintiffs’ § 2 claim relies heavily on the Court’s 
discussion of the Kodak I plaintiffs’ § 1 claim earlier in the case.161  
Additionally, the language of Kodak I is broad enough to cover both § 1 
tying and § 2 leveraging,162 and the cases that the Court cites to in Kodak I 
involve both leveraging and tying.163  This suggests that the Supreme 
Court in Kodak I intended for the reasoning of that case to apply to both 
leveraging and tying, and, at the very least, suggests that the Supreme 
Court believed that a patent holder who attempts to exploit his patent grant 
is subject to antitrust limitation. 
 
2. Consideration of Monopolists’ Business Justifications 
                                                 
157 Id. at 1327-28.  As a necessary consequence of the Federal Circuit’s holding, any 
derivative or downstream markets related to the invention at issue are within the scope of 
the claims of the patented invention for purposes of antitrust immunity.   
158 Id. at 1326-27. 
159 Id. at 1327. 
160 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (Kodak 
I). 
161 See id. at 480-86.   
162 The Court in Kodak I noted that “power gained through some natural and legal 
advantage such as a patent . . . can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant 
position in one market to expand his empire into the next.’”  Id. at 479 n.29 (quoting 
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)). 
163 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (Kodak II). 
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[47]  The Supreme Court has repeatedly examined monopolists’ proffered 
business justifications for their refusals to deal in their property.164  Given 
this precedent, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to consider Kodak’s business 
reasons for refusing to license its patented parts was more faithful to the 
Supreme Court than was the Federal Circuit, which did not examine 
Xerox’s business purposes for refusing to license its patented goods.  
While the Federal Circuit’s refusal to consider a patentee’s motivations 
may increase judicial efficiency and decrease juror confusion,165 this 
approach is not consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
 
[48]  The Federal Circuit’s refusal in Xerox to consider the second element 
of the plaintiffs’    § 2 monopolization claim ignores Supreme Court 
precedent that mandates that courts must examine an accused 
monopolist’s business justifications for his actions.166  It is not clear why 
the Federal Circuit declined to follow this business justification analysis.  
The Ninth Circuit, however, in adopting a rebuttable presumption that a 
patentee’s desire to exclude others from its patented goods is a valid 
business justification,167 properly accounted for a patentee’s business 
motivations and remained faithful to the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Kodak I and Aspen Skiing. 
B. Application of § 271 of the Patent Act to Antitrust Claims  
 
[49]  The Xerox court erred in its application of § 271(d)(4) of the Patent 
Act to support its determination that patentees are not liable under the 
antitrust laws for a refusal to license their patented goods;168 the court 
imported law relevant only to patent infringement and patent misuse into a 
case that dealt strictly with antitrust law issues.  While the literal language 
                                                 
164 E.g., Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 608-10 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 
300, 307 (1919). 
165 See R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights, 10 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 429, 439-40 (2002) (discussing the difficulties inherent in elucidating a 
monopolist’s true motivation for refusing to license his patented goods). 
166 See Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 483 (noting that once an antitrust plaintiff demonstrates that 
the antitrust defendant has monopoly power in the relevant market, the defendant must 
advance “valid business reasons” to justify its actions).   
167 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218. 
168 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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of § 271(d) may appear applicable to a case such as Xerox, a careful 
examination of the section’s language and legislative history suggests that 
the section is not applicable to antitrust violations and that courts should 
only apply § 271 to actions arising out of patent infringement. 
 
[50]  First, the literal language of § 271 suggests that Congress intended 
for the statute to govern only patent infringement actions.169  Section 271 
of the Patent Act is entitled “Infringement of patent,”170 and begins by 
describing those acts that qualify as patent infringement.171  Even the title 
of the section suggests that the Federal Circuit erred in applying § 271 to 
the facts of Xerox; Xerox did not raise any issues of patent infringement 
before the Federal Circuit. 
 
[51]  Second, § 271 describes actions that do or do not qualify as patent 
misuse in an infringement action but does not address issues of antitrust 
liability.  Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to an infringement 
action; an infringement defendant who invokes a patent misuse defense is 
essentially alleging that the plaintiff patent holder has unlawfully 
exceeded the proper scope of his patent grant.172  The Supreme Court has 
stated that patent misuse exists separately from antitrust law173 and that 
patent misuse qualifies as an antitrust violation only when the party 
claiming antitrust injury from the alleged patent misuse can also prove all 
of the necessary elements of his antitrust claim.174   
                                                 
169 See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983) (reiterating 
that the starting point for statutory interpretation is the literal language of statute). 
170 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
171 See id.  Section 271 of the Patent Act defines an infringer as one who “without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 
patent therefor.”  Id.  
172 Conduct that qualifies as patent misuse includes (1) a situation where a patentee has 
obtained his patent through fraud on the USPTO, and (2) so-called sham litigation in 
which a patentee brings an infringement claim in bad faith (i.e. with knowledge that the 
asserted patents are in fact invalid) in order to disrupt the infringement defendant’s own 
business relationships.  Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc. 174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).   
173 See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944). 
174 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp, 382 U.S. 172, 
174 (1965).  The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have also 
determined that patent misuse is not an antitrust violation unless the antitrust plaintiff can 
prove the necessary elements of their antitrust claim.  See 1995 FED. ANTITRUST 
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[52]  Specifically, § 271(d) states that: 
 
[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to 
relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent shall be denied 
relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension of the patent right by reason of 
his having done one or more of the 
following . . . (4) refused to license or use 
any rights to the patent.175 
 
In Xerox, the Federal Circuit interpreted this language to mean that 
Xerox’s refusal to license its patents to the ISO service providers was not 
an illegal extension of its patents that exposed Xerox to antitrust 
liability.176  Because patent misuse and antitrust law are independent 
doctrines,177 however, the Federal Circuit may have overextended the 
Patent Act by applying the patent misuse principles of § 271(d) to the § 2 
Sherman Act antitrust claims at issue in Xerox, where the plaintiff ISOs 
had not made any allegations of patent misuse. 
 
[53]  Third, the legislative history of § 271 of the Patent Act suggests that 
Congress did not intend for the statute to immunize patent holders from 
the antitrust laws.  The unadopted Senate version of § 271 contained 
language that explicitly discussed antitrust law and established a 
presumption against finding that a patentee’s conduct with respect to the 
sale of their patented invention could constitute a violation of the antitrust 
laws.178  Because Congress declined to enact a version of the statute that 
                                                                                                                         
GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 (stating that patent misuse may violate § 2 of the 
Sherman Act where elements otherwise necessary to establish a § 2 violation are present). 
175 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000). 
176 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
177 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 177-78; United States v. Singer 
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963); see also 1995 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra 
note 9, at 32. 
178 The proposed Senate version of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) read: 
[i]n any action in which the conduct of an owner . . . 
of an intellectual property right is alleged to be in 
violation of the antitrust laws in connection with the 
marketing or distribution of a product or service 
protected by such a right, such right shall not be 
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specifically addressed antitrust claims, Congress may not have intended 
for § 271 to apply outside of patent infringement cases.179 
 
[54]  In light of its language and legislative history, § 271(d)(4) of the 
Patent Act stands for the narrow rule that a patentee’s refusal to license or 
sell his patented good does not constitute patent misuse in an infringement 
action.  The statute does not mandate that a court immunize that same 
refusal to license or sell from antitrust liability.  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit in Xerox may have erred by importing a principle of patent misuse 
applicable only to patent infringement actions into a case based entirely on 
antitrust liability where neither litigant had alleged either patent 
infringement or patent misuse. 
 
C. Possible Consequences of the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Xerox 
 
[55]  While the simplicity of the Federal Circuit’s approach to refusals to 
deal in patented property is attractive, adopting the Xerox rule would have 
greater negative consequences for the nation’s consumers than would 
adopting the Ninth Circuit’s rule in Kodak II.  By granting patentees near-
complete freedom to leverage their patented goods across all markets in 
which those goods participate—including the downstream service or 
repair markets for those products—the Xerox rule creates additional 
                                                                                                                         
presumed to define a market or to establish market 
power, including economic power and . . . 
monopoly power.   
134 CONG. REC. S14,434 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988).  In testimony supporting this 
unenacted version of 35 U.S.C. § 271, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) noted his approval of 
the language of the bill that would make a finding of antitrust liability against patent 
holders more difficult; the bill would prevent courts from presuming that patent holders 
have market power, the first element of a § 2 Sherman Act claim.  See id. (opining that 
“[t]he mistaken characterization of intellectual property rights as automatically granting 
power over a particular market has led to unnecessary harsh treatment of patents . . . in 
some antitrust cases” where courts imposed liability on patent holders).  
179 The Ninth Circuit in Kodak II noted that while some courts and commentators had 
argued that Congress’s passage of the amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) “‘may even herald the 
prohibition of all antitrust claims . . . premised on a refusal to license a patent,’” the 
language of the statute and other case law did “not compel such a result.”  Image 
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(Kodak II) (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 
1187 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
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barriers to new businesses that seek to participate in derivative markets 
related to patented products.180 
 
[56]  Despite its shortcomings, the Federal Circuit’s approach has some 
benefits.  First, the rule is a predictable and consistent bright-line that 
monopolists, judges, and juries can easily understand.  Second, one could 
argue that holding lawful patent-related conduct immune from antitrust 
laws might provide additional financial incentives for future invention181 
because patent holders will be able to exclude competition in the lucrative 
service and repair markets for their patented goods, without running the 
risk of unforeseen antitrust liability.182  The Xerox rule will also make for 
more efficient disposition of cases involving refusals to deal in patented 
property because courts following Xerox will not have to subjectively 
divine a monopolist’s true intent for refusing to deal in his patented 
property.183 
 
[57]  Nevertheless, the Xerox decision will likely have negative 
consequences for inventors and smaller businesses.  First, because the 
Xerox rule permits patentees who dominate a market to extend their 
dominance into other markets so long as they do not engage in a tying 
arrangement, smaller competitors may be excluded from derivative 
markets for the service or repair of patented goods.  These derivative 
markets are important to the nation’s economy, since such markets 
                                                 
180 As an example of the size of service markets, IBM signed technology service contracts 
worth $17.1 billion in the fourth quarter of 2003.  IBM, Quarterly Earnings: IBM 
Reports 2003 Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year Results, at 
http://www.ibm.com/investor/4q03/4q03earnings.phtml (Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter IBM 
Quarterly Earnings]. 
181 See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
761, 789-90 (2002). 
182 The Ninth Circuit noted that imposing antitrust-based limits on the rights of 
intellectual property holders may lessen firms’ incentive to innovate, particularly where 
firms found guilty of antitrust violations are subject to treble damages.  Kodak II, 125 
F.3d at 1218; see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) (“If the 
threat of treble damage liability for refusing to license were imbedded in the minds of 
potential patent holders as a likely prospect . . . the efficacy of the economic incentives 
afforded by our patent system might be severely diminished.”); see also Carrier, supra 
note 181, at 793 (acknowledging patentees’ desire to avoid unforeseen liability due to 
consumer use of a patented product outside the product’s primary market). 
183 See Pate, supra note 165, at 439 (noting that reliance on ambiguous evidence of a 
monopolist’s intent is “likely to increase the costs and burdens of litigation and reduce 
the accuracy of decisions”). 
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generate significant revenue and employment opportunities.184  This 
market dominance is exacerbated in today’s high-technology economy, 
where so-called network effects185 create a tendency toward single-firm 
dominance in a particular product market and increase the size of a market 
over which that single firm dominates.186  Accordingly, the Xerox rule 
paves the way for a high-technology patent holder who dominates a large 
market through network effects to exclude competitors from large 
derivative markets by refusing to deal in patented goods needed to provide 
service or repair to his other widely-sold products.   
 
[58]  A second negative effect of the Xerox decision is that the decision 
may discourage innovation in derivative markets outside of a patented 
good’s primary market.  Because the Xerox rule ensures that patent 
holders will control all derivative markets related to their patented good, a 
likely result of this control will be a decrease in the level of competition-
driven innovation in those markets.187  Such a decrease in innovation may 
                                                 
184 See IBM Quarterly Earnings, supra note 180. 
185 The concept of network effects is exemplified by the markets for communications 
equipment or computer operating systems, in which one individual’s demand for a 
particular company’s product or service is positively related to the spreading use by 
others of that product.  Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved 
Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539 (2001).  One 
need look no further than the continued dominance of Microsoft’s Windows operating 
system for an illustration of the power of network effects. 
186 Although network effects may allow a monopolist to increase the size of the market 
over which he dominates, rapid advances in technology may force a monopolist to adapt 
to those changes or lose its controlling market position.  See id. at 541 (“On average, 
market power is probably less durable in the high-technology sector of the economy.”); 
see also S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, High Technology, Antitrust, & the 
Regulation of Competition: Should Technology Choice be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 
9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 318 (1996) (“Since high technology changes so frequently, a 
firm that achieved monopoly with one technology will not be able to hold on to its lead 
unless it is extremely resourceful.”). 
187 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-701 (1998), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits
=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=Anticommons&searchid=1095251557308_4693&st
ored_search=&FIRSTINDEX=0 (arguing that excessive patent protection may stifle 
innovation in important derivative markets for patented goods). 
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adversely impact consumers and runs counter to the goals of both the 
antitrust and patent laws.188 
 
[59]  A final concern with granting excessive latitude to patentees who 
refuse to deal in their patented goods is that some patentees may be able to 
assert so-called “junk patents” against their competitors without any 
antitrust limitation.  The USPTO currently receives an all-time high 
number of patent applications,189 and some believe that a result of this 
ever-increasing workload is the issuance of so-called “junk patents” that 
grant their owners the right to exclude others from making commonly-
used items.190  As an example, the USPTO has recently issued patents on 
such items as crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwiches191 and bread 
refresheners.192  The Federal Circuit’s decision to allow near-limitless 
power to patent holders who exercise their patent rights raises the 
possibility of a “junk patent” holder leveraging his patent rights across 
multiple markets without any antitrust-based limits on that power. 
 
D. Proposed Solutions to Conflicting Recent Appellate Decisions 
 
[60]  Application of the Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit’s respective 
analyses of refusals to deal in patented property leads to differing 
outcomes for patent holders who have refused to license or sell their 
patented property.  As a result, patent holders are left with considerable 
uncertainty as to how far they may extend their statutory patent rights.  
This uncertainty will likely lead to future litigation as parties seek to 
                                                 
188 For example, the Supreme Court noted in Kodak I that some of Kodak’s service 
customers preferred the ISOs’ service to that of Kodak.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483-84 (1992). 
189 See Michael S. Malone, The Smother of Invention, FORBES ASAP, June 24, 2002, at 
32.  Over the last twenty years, there has been a meteoric rise in the number of patent 
applications received by the Patent and Trademark Office.  As of 2002, the USPTO was 
receiving more than 375,000 patent applications each year and was faced with a backlog 
of more than 350,000 applications.  Id.  
190 See Pitofsky, supra note 185, at 543; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible 
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System 
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 606 (1999).  See IPWatchdog’s website for a 
regularly updated listing of obscure and useless patents issued by the PTO.  IPWatchdog, 
Museum of Obscure Patents, at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patentmuseum.html (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2004). 
191 U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999). 
192 U.S. Patent No. 6,080,436 (issued June 27, 2000). 
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definitively establish when a refusal to license a patented good violates 
antitrust law.  A solution to this uncertainty could come in the form of 
either an amendment to the Patent Act to establish that patent-related 
conduct is not insulated from the antitrust laws, or a Supreme Court 
decision that affirms either Kodak II or Xerox. 
  
[61]  Congress could harmonize the discord in the courts’ approaches to 
refusals to deal in patented property by amending the Patent Act.  One 
place for such an amendment is § 154 of the Patent Act;193 that section sets 
forth the rights of a patent holder and is a logical location for Congress to 
set out a limitation on patent holders’ rights.194  A possible remedy to the 
current confusion in the law would be to amend the language of § 154 to 
include, “a patent holder’s right to grant or refuse access to or the purchase 
of his patented invention is subject to all other laws protecting this 
nation’s trade and commerce.”  Making such an amendment would 
provide a clear statement to courts and patent holders that the exercise of 
patent rights is subject to antitrust limitations.195 
  
[62]  An alternative method for creating a settled standard for analysis of 
refusals to deal in patented property would be for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari in a future case where a litigant alleges that a refusal to 
deal in patented property is a violation of antitrust laws.196  Should this 
occur, the Supreme Court should affirm Kodak II; doing so would be 
consistent with the Court’s own precedent and also with the analysis that 
many courts apply to § 2 monopolization cases.  Although affirming 
Kodak II would require that courts perform a labor-intensive examination 
of the business justifications underlying a patentee’s refusal to deal in their 
                                                 
193 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
194 In relevant part, § 154(a)(1) states, “[e]very patent shall contain . . . a grant to the 
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling the invention.”  Id. § 154(a)(1). 
195 Some commentators have suggested that Congress amend the language of 35 U.S.C. § 
271(d)(4) to state that a patent owner shall not be guilty of misuse or illegal extension of 
their patent for a refusal to license that patented good “in the primary market for the 
patent good.”  E.g., Patrick H. Moran, Comment, The Federal and Ninth Circuits Square 
Off: Refusals to Deal and the Precarious Intersection Between Antitrust and Patent Law, 
87 MARQ. L. REV. 387, 421 (2003). 
196 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Kodak II, Image Technical Services., Inc. 
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 
(1998), and Xerox Corp., CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S 1143 (2001). 
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patented property, courts already perform such examinations in antitrust 
cases,197 and such a rule would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
own precedent in Kodak I.198   
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
[63]  The question of whether a patent holder who refuses to license his 
patented property should be immune from antitrust liability is a difficult 
one, and appellate courts have reached different conclusions on this issue.  
Given the current state of the law, patentees are faced with considerable 
uncertainty as to how far they may extend their patent rights and it is not 
clear what effect that uncertainty will have on future innovation and 
competition. 
 
[64]  While the above-discussed cases differ in their conclusions as to 
whether a patent holder who refuses to license his patent should incur 
antitrust liability, courts agree that a refusal to license patented goods 
violates the antitrust laws in certain situations.199  First, a patentee who (1) 
engages in patent misuse by asserting a patent obtained through fraud on 
the USPTO or (2) initiates a sham infringement proceeding against a 
defendant in an effort to interfere with the defendant’s own business 
relationships is subject to antitrust liability if the patentee’s opponent can 
show that the two elements of a § 2 monopolization claim are met.200  
Second, a patentee may not tie the sale of his patented product to the 
purchase of a different product in a separate market.201   
  
                                                 
197 See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(performing an exhaustive examination of a software company’s proffered business-
related justifications for allegedly anticompetitive licensing and product integration). 
198 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (Kodak 
I) (stating that antitrust liability for firms accused of leveraging a monopoly from one 
market into another depends on whether “‘valid business reasons’” could explain the 
firm’s actions) (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585, 605 (1985) (Aspen Skiing II)). 
199 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  A 
patentee’s refusal to deal in patented property can lead to antitrust liability only where the 
patentee and the would-be licensee are direct competitors.  See id. at 1363. 
200 See Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1326; see also Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 
174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
201 See Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
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[65]  The Kodak II and Xerox decisions demonstrate two differing 
approaches to resolving the tension between patent law and antitrust law 
from a refusal to deal in patented goods, and each approach will lead to 
different repercussions for the nation’s consumers.  The Federal Circuit’s 
Xerox decision elevates patent rights above antitrust limitations and does 
not consider a patentee’s subjective motivation for his refusal to deal in his 
patented goods.  Xerox thus enables a patentee to avoid antitrust immunity 
by simply invoking his statutorily-granted patent right to exclude.  This 
decision has the potential to deter competition and innovation in derivative 
markets related to the primary market for a patented good, and the 
deterrence of innovation runs counter to the goals of both antitrust and 
patent law. 
 
[66]  By comparison, the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II did not prioritize patent 
rights over antitrust limitations because that court considered whether a 
patentee’s business motives could legitimately support a refusal to license 
his patented property.  However, a Kodak II-style subjective analysis of a 
patentee’s motivations is inherently unpredictable and may leave patent 
holders without clear boundaries on extending their patent rights into new 
markets.  As a consequence of Kodak II, some firms may decline to invest 
in innovative activities for fear of incurring antitrust liability from 
inadvertently overextending their patent rights.  Until either Congress or 
the Supreme Court takes the initiative to resolve the current discord in the 
law governing refusals to deal in patented property, patent holders and 
those who are denied access to patented goods will continue to operate in 
a state of uncertainty. 
 
